I want to discuss some questions I have regarding Jan Narveson’s “Feeding the Hungry”and his distinction between justice and charity. Narveson thinks of charity as a good act and a virtue, but not something required to be morally good. I took this to mean that he regards an act that we are compelled to do by our compassion or a sense of purely personal duty as an act of charity. He also claims “an act as one that we may forcibly compel people to do” is an act of justice, meaning in his view justice is anything that is morally enforceable. It’s not entirely clear to me what Narveson is saying by using the word forced. Choosing to act in any sense is not physically forcible, so is he saying that justice is a moral imperative whereas charity is a moral suggestion? And if so, what drives this imperative? Does Narveson see justice as a sort of social contract one is obligated to just by being human? If charity as a virtue is coming from our implicit desire to help others, where is the implied necessity to act justly coming from? I also have questions about his use of the word virtue and how that excludes justice. Narveson directly claims in the conclusion that charity is a virtue, which implies that in his view virtues are more like moral additives than genuine morality. In other philosophy I know, virtues are regarded more as essentials of morality, and justice is explicitly a virtue while charity is not. This is a Socratic/Platonic view, where the 4 cardinal virtues are Justice, Courage, Wisdom, and Temperance/Moderation and these four qualities will lead a person to happiness, which is equated with excellence. If virtues according to Plato are the qualities required for moral excellence, then is virtue for Narveson consisting of qualities outside of or beyond what simply makes one moral? What then would Narveson categorize justice as? Are there other qualities Narveson would consider to be of the same moral imperative status?